Is Democracy in a State of Regression?

Scholars and observers have employed various terminologies such as “backsliding,” “regression,” “recession,” and more to describe a certain phenomenon. However, irrespective of the specific language they use, these terms essentially allude to the gradual decay of democratic principles and institutions across the globe. The central question at hand is whether we are indeed witnessing a decline in democracy. Posing this inquiry delves into the assessment of whether democratic values and the structures supporting them are currently weakening. As an aspiring political scientist, it is only right to engage in examining the symptoms and underlying causes of this situation to determine its actual extent and implications, and find a way to prevent or undo it.

In the contemporary world, discussions surrounding the state of democracy often oscillate between optimism and pessimism. This essay critically reflects on the assertion that we are not experiencing a democratic regression but, rather, a period of stability or as what Larry Diamond called, “a period of stasis” (Diamond, 1996, p. 37). Over the past quarter-century, extraordinary democratic achievements have shaped the global political landscape, debunking the notion of democracy's inevitable decline. This period has witnessed the expansion and consolidation of democratic governance in many regions, offering reasons to believe in democracy's resilience.

In an article entitled “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Levitsky & Way (2015) articulated how the view that the world has fallen into a “democratic recession” is being shared among many observers and democracy advocates. However, the authors have begged to disagree and argued that this perception is not entirely accurate. As per Levitsky & Way (2015), the state of global democracy has in fact, remained stable and has even improved compared to the 1990s.

Albeit the article was published in 2015, its arguments remain relevant in the present. In 2020, the news was dominated by a series of setbacks and catastrophes for freedom. Despite these challenges, democracy has shown its ability to recover from repeated blows. The Freedom House Organization called it as "the resilience of democracy" amidst the global decline in freedom over the past 15 years. In an article titled "Democracy under Seige", Freedom House stated that:

“Democracy today is beleaguered but not defeated. Its enduring popularity in a more hostile world and its perseverance after a devastating year are signals of resilience that bode well for the future of freedom” - Amy Slipowitz & Sarah Repucci (2021), Freedom House Organization

Malawi stands out as a prime example, experiencing significant progress during the year 2020. The Malawian people endured a struggling democratic system plagued by corrupt and heavy-handed leaders. The credibility of the mid-2019 national elections, which initially declared victory for the incumbent president, was compromised by evidence of vote tampering using correction fluid. Although the election commission hesitated to call for a new vote, opposition candidates pursued the case in the constitutional court. In a landmark ruling in February 2020, the court, resisting bribery attempts, ordered fresh elections. In the June rerun, opposition presidential candidate Lazarus Chakwera secured victory, highlighting the ability of independent institutions to curb abuse of power. The implications of Malawi's election rerun extend beyond its borders, as other African courts have asserted their independence in recent years, and the annulment of a flawed election, only the second time in the continent's history, will not go unnoticed (Freedom House Organization, 2021).

Taiwan also faced challenges in 2020, effectively suppressing the coronavirus without resorting to abusive methods and countering threats from an increasingly aggressive regime in China. Despite benefiting from prior experience with SARS, Taiwan's response to COVID-19 respected civil liberties. Early adoption of expert recommendations, the distribution of protective equipment, and efficient contact-tracing and testing efforts prioritizing transparency, combined with the country's island geography, contributed to disease control. Simultaneously, Beijing escalated efforts to sway global opinion against Taiwan's government and undermine the success of its democracy. Taiwan's voters, resisting a politicized disinformation campaign from China, overwhelmingly reelected President Tsai Ing-wen, who opposes moves toward unification with the mainland, even before the virus outbreak (Freedom House Organization, 2021).

Similarly, Levitsky & Way (2015) argued that contrary to the prevailing narrative, stability and improvement in democracy scores from 2000 to 2013, coupled with a higher number of countries showing democratic advances compared to declines, suggest that there is no widespread erosion of democratic values and institutions. The data they gathered have shown that there are far more democratic advances than democratic breakdowns. Of these cases of democracy breakdowns, some saw marginal score declines and remained borderline democracies. From this, a conclusion is drawn that the overall picture from the last decade is one of net stability in global democracy (Levistky & Way, 2015).

Indeed, Levitsky and Way's perspective is far from mere hallucinations or baseless theorizations; rather, it is grounded in concrete real-world situations. Their analysis draws strength from empirical evidence derived from reputable global democracy indices, including Freedom House, Polity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertelsmann Democracy Index. These indices, being widely acknowledged benchmarks, provide a robust foundation for challenging the prevailing narrative of a global democratic decline. Examining the data meticulously reveals not only a countervailing pattern of democratic advances outweighing breakdowns but also nuances in cases of democratic erosion. Instances of breakdowns often involve marginal score declines, leaving countries teetering on the borderline of democracy. This detailed scrutiny underscores the importance of considering the specific nature of democratic challenges in different contexts.

Moreover, the trajectory of stability and improvement in democracy scores from 2000 to 2013 adds temporal depth to Levitsky and Way's argument, suggesting that concerns about a widespread erosion of democratic values and institutions may be exaggerated. While it is imperative to remain vigilant and address concerning developments, a more nuanced understanding that acknowledges and celebrates the progress made in sustaining and strengthening democratic systems globally is essential. 

Just recently, Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the global COVID-19 pandemic, challenged both economic and democratic resilience. Despite prolonged periods of stress from the aftermath of the 2009 global financial crisis, OECD countries have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Governments and democratic systems have played a central role in responding to these crises, effectively containing and reversing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and addressing the consequences of Russia's war on Ukraine, including economic challenges (OECD, 2021[2]).

Where are these speculations of democratic decline coming from?

The question now is, why are we then speculating about the existence of a democratic regression in the very first place? Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that the optimism surrounding democratization in the early 1990s, driven by a misconception that the fall of authoritarian regimes automatically led to democracy, created the illusion of backsliding. The surge in successful democratization efforts during that period oversimplified regime transitions, neglecting complex factors like autocrats' adaptability and the drivers of regime "openings." The article emphasizes the need for a nuanced and critical perspective in studying democratization, acknowledging diverse outcomes from regime crises.

The mid-2000s signified a transitional phase in global democratization, with many countries on the path to democratic governance. However, Levitsky and Way (2015) stress the importance of a realistic perspective on democratization's limitations. Structural factors, they argue, are pivotal, and unrealistic expectations that should not obscure our understanding of these complexities. Recognizing that stable democratization is improbable in certain contexts and cautioning against exaggerated voluntarism must be considered.

What is my personal take on this argument?

Levitsky and Way's (2015) nuanced and critical perspective on the prevailing notion that the fall of authoritarian regimes inevitably leads to the rise of democracy makes sense. They contend that the optimism surrounding democratization in the early 1990s was fueled by an illusion of backsliding and a simplistic assumption that regime change equates to the establishment of democratic governance. This argument highlights the failure to consider the intricate factors influencing regime transitions, including the adaptability of autocrats, the drivers of regime "openings," and the misconception that state failure inherently leads to democratization, which adds to its convincing powers.

Thus, their analysis emphasizes the need to acknowledge the diverse outcomes that can result from regime crises, urging scholars and policymakers to approach the study of democratization with a more nuanced and critical lens. The recognition that stable democratization remains improbable in certain circumstances is a crucial aspect of this perspective, countering unrealistic expectations. It further emphasizes the significance of structural factors in shaping the possibilities for democratization and cautions against exaggerated voluntarism that may lead to misguided expectations.

With that said, it is indeed safe to assert that we are not experiencing a decline in democracy; rather, we are in a phase commonly referred to as a period of stability. The authors assert that the current state of democracy signifies stability, not decline, emphasizing the endurance of young democracies in South America and Central Europe for over a quarter-century. These democracies, facing economic crises and reforms, showcase resilience and challenge pessimistic narratives. The rarity and brevity of democratic breakdowns are highlighted, with key strengthening examples across continents, including Brazil, India, Chile, Croatia, Ghana, Mexico, Taiwan, Colombia, and Poland. Central to the argument is the adaptability of democracies, countering negative perspectives and emphasizing their capacity to flourish in diverse contexts.

Overall, the successes of democracy in the face of numerous challenges further bolster the argument for stability rather than regression. In conclusion, the reflection on the state of global democracy provides a compelling argument against the notion of democratic regression. The period in question appears to be one of stability rather than decline, characterized by remarkable achievements in democratic expansion, the endurance of new democracies, and the rarity of democratic breakdowns. These successes underscore democracy's inherent resilience and adaptability, even in the face of substantial global challenges. It is essential to recognize that the narrative of democracy is multifaceted, and while challenges persist, the enduring strength of democratic values and institutions should not be underestimated. This period of stability should serve as a source of inspiration for those committed to the advancement of democracy worldwide.

“If free societies fail to take these basic steps, the world will become ever more hostile to the values they hold dear, and no country will be safe from the destructive effects of dictatorship.” - Amy Slipowitz & Sarah Repucci (2021), Freedom House Organization

Those against freedom are spreading a false idea that democracy is on the decline because it cannot meet people’s needs (Freedom House Organization, 2021). The biggest dilemma is that key democratic countries are not doing enough to protect it. Thus, democratic nations must come together globally and support each other. Moreover, they need to fix their own issues to strengthen their credibility and protect their institutions from politicians and others who might ignore democratic principles to gain power.

To fortify democratic resilience amid multifaceted crises, governments should take decisive measures to bolster trust in public institutions over the long run. Democracies, distinguished by checks and balances, face competition from governance models that offer seemingly faster crisis responses. Relying solely on contingency planning and occasional exceptional measures is insufficient for safeguarding economic and democratic resilience. Governments need to establish public governance processes and standards systematically to uphold and enhance trust in institutions during crises. Taking action now represents an investment in solidifying democratic resilience for the future and subsequent generations (OECD, 2021[1]).

References:

Diamond, L. J. (1996). Is the Third Wave Over?. Journal of Democracy, 7(3), 20-37.

Democracy under Siege. (2020). Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracyundersiege#:~:text=The%20resilience%20of%20democracy,important%20gains%20during%20the%20year

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2015). The myth of democratic recession. Journal of Democracy, 26, 45.

[1] OECD (2022), “Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy”, OECD Legal Instruments, No. OECD/LEGAL/0484, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0484.

[2] OECD (2021), Government at a Glance 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en.