Legacy Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Successor Parties
- DAZEL DAYRIT
- Dec 18, 2023
- 6 min read
"Authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of the global democratic landscape." - Loxton, 2018
Authoritarian successor parties, by definition, are "parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy" (Loxton 2015). The operationalization of this transition involves specific criteria that shed light on the diverse origins of these parties. The first condition involves parties that were once the ruling entities within authoritarian regimes. The origins of such parties vary; they may have been intentionally created by authoritarian incumbents, as seen in the case of Indonesia's Golkar. Alternatively, these parties might have predated the authoritarian regime, provided they were strategically utilized by the regime as its ruling party for a substantial period, exemplified by Paraguay's Colorado Party, Mexico's PRI, and Hungary's MSzP . This party is also known as "former authoritarian ruling parties" (Loxton, 2018).
The second condition encapsulates parties created by high-level authoritarian incumbents either in anticipation of an imminent transition to democracy or shortly after such a transition. They are called as "reactive authoritarian successor parties". The key actors in this scenario include heads of state, ministers, and influential figures within the security apparatus. The latter subtype is often founded by high-level authoritarian incumbents. The Spanish PP and Bolivia's ADN exemplify this category (Loxton, 2018).
On one hand, parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who defect and move into opposition before the transition to democracy are excluded from the authoritarian successor party category, as are parties established more than one election cycle after the identified transition year. The criteria for identifying a party as "prominent" further refines our understanding of authoritarian successor parties. On the other hand, a party is deemed prominent if it secures 10 percent or more of the vote in a single national election after the year of the transition to democracy (Loxton, 2018). This criterion emphasizes the electoral success and significance of these parties in shaping the post-authoritarian political landscape.
The critical analysis of authoritarian successor parties raises important questions about the legacy of authoritarianism in democratic contexts. While these parties adapt to new political environments, the potential retention of undemocratic practices or norms from their authoritarian past merits careful examination. Moreover, the success of these parties prompts inquiries into the factors contributing to their electoral appeal and longevity within democratic systems. However, I believe that electoral success and longevity of authoritarian successor parties present a puzzle that demands examination. These parties have surprisingly demonstrated a remarkable ability to not only survive but thrive in democratic systems. With that, it is only logical to ask the question: How and why do they often win elections?
Securing victories in elections signifies their adeptness at perpetuating their hold on power, and the sustained nature of their dominance contributes to their prevalence on a global scale. With that said, one critical factor contributing to the prevalence of authoritarian successor parties is the inheritance of valuable resources from the authoritarian past. Paradoxically, the structures and resources that once sustained authoritarian rule become assets for these parties in the democratic era. This could include established organizational networks, financial resources, and, perhaps most importantly, name recognition among the electorate (Loxton, 2018). The transformation from authoritarian ruling party to successor party underscores the malleability of these political entities, allowing them to adapt to new political landscapes while leveraging the advantages gained during their authoritarian past.
This idea nods to the analysis of Kitschelt & Singer (2018) in Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties. One notable aspect highlighted in the article is the extensive formal and informal infrastructures that FARPs or former authoritarian ruling parties, tend to cultivate. They similarly argue, along with Loxton, how FARPs leverage their roots in the previous authoritarian regime to build larger networks. This organizational advantage, both formal and informal, in turn, allows the parties to establish robust connections with local notables and civil society organizations.
Moreover, the research indicates that FARPs excel in clientelistic mobilization efforts compared to other parties. On average, FARPs engage more intensively in clientelistic strategies, even when considering variations in electoral success. Multivariate models reveal that FARP status contributes significantly to a party's clientelistic efforts, and this is further influenced by the organizational network size. This suggests that the organizational advantage of FARPs is a mediating factor driving their heightened focus on clientelistic targeting (Kitschelt & Singer 2018).
A key takeaway from this analysis is that authoritarian successor parties often win elections because they benefit from a head start in organizational development. Inheriting a pre-established organizational infrastructure and associational ties to civil society provides them with a significant advantage in engaging in intense voter–politician exchanges. This highlights that the quantity and quality of organizational structures and networks jointly contribute to their success in building specific clientelistic linkages. However, this success of authoritarian successor parties raises concerns about the consolidation of democratic practices. If these parties bring with them undemocratic practices or norms from their authoritarian past, it could pose challenges to the development of a robust democratic culture. The fine line between adaptation and the perpetuation of undemocratic elements warrants careful scrutiny by both scholars and policymakers.
Contextualizing this in our country, the assessment of Philippine political dynamics indeed reveals historical legacies, electoral strategies, and the enduring influence of former ruling parties especially for the Marcoses. The Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), as the former ruling party of dictator Ferdinand Marcos, stands as a borderline case for inclusion. The party lost power in the 1986 transition to democracy, and subsequent elections showed varying degrees of electoral performance. However, the 1992 presidential election marked a significant turn as Imelda Marcos, the former dictator's widow and a KBL candidate, secured over 10 percent of the vote (Loxton, 2018). This electoral success, albeit marginal, raises questions about the KBL's status as an authoritarian successor party.
To determine if KBL qualifies as an authoritarian successor party, one must examine its organizational networks, historical ties, and the nature of its electoral strategies. The party's association with the Marcos regime, coupled with Imelda Marcos' candidacy, suggests a link to the authoritarian past. However, the borderline inclusion suggests that the KBL's organizational strength may be less pronounced compared to other clear-cut cases of authoritarian successor parties. In analyzing this, he inclusion criteria for scoring a party as having returned to power is crucial. Loxton (2018) articulated that a political party is deemed to have returned to power when a member of that party assumes the presidency in a presidential system, the office of the prime minister in a parliamentary system, or either the presidency or the prime minister’s office in a semi-presidential system. Hence, from this basis alone, if the answers were only between yes and no to the question whether KBL is an authoritarian successor party, the answer would be no.
Thus, the resurgence of the Marcos family cannot be owed to the authoritarian successor parties in the country. What provides the most leverage in understanding why another Marcos won the presidential elections are theories based on continuity, coalition, history, and identity. The strong predictors of voting for Ferdinand Marcos Jr were support for former President Rodrigo Duterte and positive perceptions of the late President Ferdinand Marcos and martial law (Dulay, et.al., 2023), which provides an intriguing lens through which to interpret current political trends especially on the alarming 'authoritarian nostalgia' in the Philippines.
The roots of authoritarian nostalgia in the Philippines are deeply intertwined with the historical legacy of Ferdinand Marcos' Sr. rule. Characterized by a facade of stability and order, the Marcos era holds a certain allure for segments of the population, particularly those who associate it with a sense of security amidst perceived political and social turmoil in subsequent years. This nostalgia is further fueled by selective memory, where individuals may idealize economic development projects and law and order initiatives while downplaying or ignoring instances of human rights abuses and corruption that marked the regime. The Marcos era's ambitious infrastructure projects and economic initiatives, though associated with corruption, contribute to the nostalgic narrative, particularly among those who experienced tangible improvements in their livelihoods during that time.
The strong political persona cultivated by Ferdinand Marcos and his family, characterized by perceived strength and charisma, adds another layer to this nostalgia, with some longing for a time when the country had a powerful and decisive leader. The continuation of political influence by the Marcos family through electoral participation keeps the family name in the public eye, contributing to a sense of nostalgia for an era synonymous with political prominence. Additionally, media influence plays a pivotal role, with positive portrayals or selective coverage coupled with historical revisionism of the Marcos era in certain outlets contributing to the cultivation of nostalgic sentiments among the public. Overall, this multifaceted interplay of historical memory, economic perceptions, political personas, and media narratives shapes the nostalgia for authoritarianism in the Philippines that aided Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to rise into power and continue his father's legacy.
**
References:
Dulay, D., Hicken, A., Menon, A., Holmes, R. (2023). Continuity, History, and Identity: Why Bongbong Marcos Won the 2022 Philippine Presidential Election. Pacific Affairs, doi: 10.5509/202396185
Kitschelt, H., & Singer, M. (2018). Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties, 53–83. Life after dictatorship: authoritarian successor parties worldwide. Cambridge University Press.
Loxton, J. (2015). Authoritarian Successor Parties. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 157–170. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0052
Loxton, J., & Mainwaring, S. (Eds.). (2018). Life after dictatorship: authoritarian successor parties worldwide. Cambridge University Press.
Comments